Nukes or no Nukes?
By Khalid Saleem

WE have every right to wonder as to why must our strategic ally feel the urge to raise an alarm every now and then about the security of our nukes? After all, we are not unique. There are several other states that are overt and/or covert nuclear states. There may be some others that may fit the twilight zone.

The breakup of the Soviet Union left several loose ends. Although the powers that be did their damnedest to tie up several of these loose ends; yet one can never be certain about these matters. Why does one not, then, hear about doubts about the security of the nukes of these twilight zone countries? Why us and us alone?

After all nukes are nukes; they are hardly footballs or Oscar statuettes that can be spirited away in the dead of night. Chaps, who have passed through the horrible intricacies of the manufacture of these wretched things, surely must know a thing or two about how to keep the thingumies secure.

And yet our own friends – strategic allies to boot – not only refuse to give up their misgivings but also add to the confusion. Or, is there more to this than meets the eye?

The US intelligence had this to say in its annual report released on 05 February: “Political turmoil in Pakistan has not seriously threatened the military’s control of its nuclear weapons but vulnerabilities still exist”.

This is not the first or only time that there has been talk of vulnerabilities or similar compound words. One would recall that the US presidential hopefuls have felt no compunction at all in using Pakistan and its nukes as the whipping horse to give verve to their flagging campaigns.

The US print media then went to town and the Op-ed writers had a field day at the expense of Pakistan’s nukes.

It left one wondering if it was for this day that the Pakistani nation had opted to go nuclear. Leader after leader over the past several years before the “bomb” was actually exploded had expressed their determination to go for it.

Determination was also expressed that the nation was prepared to eat grass in order to achieve this end. The pity is that it is always the common man who gets the short end of the stick. There is a lot of difference, for instance, between announcing the nation’s readiness to eat grass and to actually go ahead and do it (eat grass, that is!).

The question that presents itself is: why would the Pakistani nation sacrifice its all merely to be the proud possessor of the “bomb”? After all so many countries are doing very well without the privilege.

The only reason one can latch on to is the need for the ever-elusive security. It has been argued by the pro-nuke lobby that the “bomb” was an essential step towards giving the nation a much-needed sense of security. Whether or not this is a valid argument is open to question.

In order to add substance to the argument in favour of going nuclear, the concept of strategic balance and deterrence was advanced with devastating effect.

The lobby for maintenance of strategic balance in the subcontinent was not only advanced at home but also became the common mantra to be chanted by our diplomats as far afield as New York, Brussels, Beijing and Tokyo. The fact that no one took us seriously does not appear to have discouraged our policy makers who, incidentally, may have shared the same parentage with the aforementioned lobbyists.

The chorus was, in due course, taken up by our very own pseudo-intellectual crowd who used up several gallons of ink to further the argument that the explosion and the resulting ‘bomb’ had in fact assured our security against the threat from the east. The argument – such as it was – went something like this: since we possessed the ‘bomb’, our enemy would now not dare to threaten us.

The matter was thus conveniently reduced to a simple linear equation without the encumbrance of annoying variables.

Those who had argued in favour of the explosion went wild with delight. Those who had taken the decision ‘to go ahead’ basked in the glory of the moment until the awful truth dawned on them. Nuclear weapons, it soon became clear, were akin to a double-edged sword.

Whatever clout they afforded was more than counterbalanced by the weight of responsibility that hung over the shoulders of those responsible for their security. The joy of having ‘joined the nuclear club’ brought with it an atmosphere at the same time of awe and intimidation.

Whether or not the nation should have gone ahead with the explosion as also whether the great decision had, in effect, delivered is a question that has never been fully gone into, much less answered. It would require the wisdom and hard work of a dedicated research scholar. But that, as they say, is another story.

For the time being one may restrict oneself to the concept of the nukes acting as a strategic deterrent against a stronger adversary – and a nuclear weapon state in its own right.

One thing that needs must be recognized is that the ‘use’ of a nuclear weapon per se in today’s world can under no circumstances be even contemplated. One may go a step further and aver that the ‘use’ of the nukes was effectively cut off after the US adventures at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It was not the “use” but the “threat to use” nuclear weapons that formed the basis of the strategic chess game between the then superpowers during the period of the Cold War. In order to make this argument effective, therefore, the “right of first use” has to be asserted. Once the right of first use is waived, the very deterrent value of a nuke is lost. The question that confronts us then is: are nukes affording the nation with the degree of security that they were touted to provide?

It would appear now that the time of reckoning is upon us. Through the signing of the nuclear pact the United States has ensured that India has thereby been effectively taken out of the sub-continental strategic equation. Pakistan is now open to be dealt with on a separate plane – more or less like a nuclear pariah state.

The ‘ security of the nukes’ game that is being played at the expense of Pakistan is intended to cancel out whatever strategic advantage this country had ever hoped to squeeze out of its nuclear muscle.

If the gentle reader has emerged from the above narrative with a boggled mind one can only offer one’s sympathy. Nonetheless, it may not be out of place to aver that the time may well have come to subject our strategic doctrines to a new and in depth appraisal. Who knows we may be in for a surprise!●