Troubled Pak-US Alliance
By Hamid Alvi

THE news reports emanating from Washington tend to convey the message that the Pak-U.S. Alliance against terrorism carefully worked out by President Bush and President Musharraf, and repeatedly sworn to be strong and long term by the two countries top diplomats, is running into grave trouble.

The commonality of interest that is elimination of terrorism, still remains the binding force between the two nations, but how best to realize that objective, has generated differences. Several indicators confirm this perception.

True, the frequent complaint that Pakistan was not “doing enough” is beginning to look like a joke and has gradually dropped from the diplomatic statements, still the voices raised in Washington indirectly point to the same outlook.

The latest observation in that regard was that of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Answering questions at a Congressional hearing, Ms. Rice said that, “frankly speaking Pakistan’s agreement with Waziristan tribal leaders is not working”.

The implication was that Pakistan must give up the idea of political solution of the issue and resume the military operation, and that too of the level and magnitude determined by Washington.

Its is not realized by the American policy makers that after earlier loss of more than six hundred troops in the Waziri conflict, people of Pakistan are not willing to support the military operation anymore.

Another reason, perhaps the foremost, is that in the rugged mountains of Waziristan or for that matter any other tribal community, it is almost impossible to differentiate between a terrorist and simple tribesman.

They all carry guns, are born guerilla fighters, and strongly believe in “badal” or revenge. When the governor of NWFP says that it would be an unwinable war, he is not far from the truth. History supports the outlook of Governor Aurakzai.

The Mughals from Akbar the great to Aurangzeb could not subjugate the Pushtoon tribes; the British met the same fate and the Russians in the process lost an empire. The resurgence of so called Taliban is no different.

It shows that despite unprecedented bombing and destruction of their military structure albeit rag-tag, their spirit for independence could not be destroyed.

On the heels of Ms. Rice’s statement came the anger ridden comments of Tom Koenigs on the observations of Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai, the governor of NWFP whose province is bearing the brunt of conflict.

Unlike the usual conduct of United Nations diplomats Koenigs who is the chief UN representative in Afghanistan, entered into direct war of words with Governor Aurakzai.

Giving us a sermon on how bad the Taliban are and warning us that Pakistan is a candidate for Talibanization, he urged neighboring states to help stop the repeat of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

The UN Representative however, was most irked by Aurakzai’s press talk, Feb 16, wherein he had claimed that the support for militant operators in Afghanistan has developed into a national resistance, a “liberation war against coalition forces”.

Unlike the honorable UN diplomat, Pakistanis who had witnessed the Pashtoon fight against the Soviets must be least surprised by the Governor’s assessment. Being a Pashtoon himself Aurakzai knows his community better than others. His assessment should not be dismissed as biased propaganda as the UN diplomat seems to be doing.

Instead of debating over who is doing what, attention should be given to the fact that all those who are alleged to be Taliban are ethnic Pashtoons with the possibility of converting their insurgency into Pushtoon nationalism inspired by the idea of liberating their country from what is billed as “foreign occupation”.

The same day the UN representative launched the war of words against the Pakistani official, the New York Times came out with a lengthy report alleging that the Al Qaeda has set up new training camps inside North Waziristan, and that the Pentagon was advocating direct U.S. strikes to destroy the camps.

The newspaper quoted the unidentified U.S. analysts as the source. The blame game resumed again. The fresh accusations forced the Pakistani ambassador Mahmud Ali Durrani to go back to U.S. media to disclose that Pakistan has recently destroyed two camps of terrorists in the tribal area, and that intelligence about the camps was provided by the U.S. agencies. Durrani defended the Aurakzai thesis by pointing out that the war against terrorism can not be won without taking the tribal chiefs into confidence.

The foregoing shows that although Pakistan and the U.S. are in agreement as far as the war against terrorism goes, they have serious differences over the tactics.

While Pakistan would like to resolve the conflicts through political means, the U.S. seeks quick military solution. One may ask the supporters of military solution that how on earth could one destroy every single Taliban to claim victory.

They keep multiplying. Today’s farmer is tomorrow’s Taliban. This is not a war between standing armies. The regular troops of NATO are pitted against irregular guerillas at home ground of the later. The Taliban have nothing to loose. They own no cities, have no infrastructure and no well built villages.

The NATO troops on the other hand assigned to keep running not only the Afghan government and secure the reconstruction of the country but also fight back Taliban guerillas.

Religiously motivated Taliban bury their dead at the spot they are killed, whereas NATO troops casualties are hauled across the oceans and mourned all around. In the present situation therefore, fighting Taliban would lead the allies no where. Conventional victory at this stage is inconceivable.

It has been proved more than once that regular armies are at a disadvantage when their antagonists are guerillas, supported by a terrain like the Pashtoons have.

The Soviets fought for ten years using the most modern military equipment but success alluded them on every front. Finally they had to seek political solution. Only negotiations through the UN channels made it possible for them to disengage and get out of Afghanistan.

Pak-US differences over the tactics of fighting the war against terror could prove disadvantageous for both sides ...for Pakistan it means loss of military and economic assistance it is getting for the U.S., and for the U.S. ending a war without achieving the object of political and social stability.

The mounting U.S. pressure on Pakistan for military action to stop alleged cross border movement of Taliban could also contribute to widening the differences between the two parties.

From the stand point of Pakistani perception firstly a fool proof sealing of border is beyond the realm of possibility, and secondly the problem basically is within the boundaries of Afghanistan.

One should not ignore the fact that Taliban activities are bank rolled by the Afghana drug lords who provide $800 million a year to the farmer, according to Time Magazine, for protecting the poppy crop from government police.

Similarly, the attack on Vice-President Cheny evidently originated from within Afghanistan. President Karzai’s practice of “blame game” wont work in this dreadful venture happenings within the limits of high security area.

Although the U.S. government keeps denying or pretends to be denying, the stories continue to pop up in the American press that Washington is sending “tough messages” to Pakistan to act now, and V.P Cheny’s mission was one such undertaking.

The White House spokesman Tony Snow’s response to the “tough message” insinuation was neither a denial nor an admission. He said February 26, “We have not been saying it is ‘tough message’. What we are saying is; the Vice President is meeting with President Musharraf because we do understand the importance of making even greater progress against Al Qaeda, against Taliban.”

Such statements confirm the suspicion that the Pak-US alliance made public with lot of fan fare after 9/11 is in trouble, and better be cured before things go beyond control.●

© 2007 Hamid Alvi